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Although Justice Hanson’s judicial career spanned only seven
years, his impact on the law in Minnesota will extend far into the
future. He often provided balance to the court in difficult or
controversial cases, either writing for a narrow majority or a large
minority. In other instances, Justice Hanson stood out from the
court with his unyielding desire to preserve the role of the judiciary
in governing the common law and his call for sweeping reform in
favor of recovery for victims of torts committed by the government.
Whether the case called for defining the rights of the criminally
† Jeff Ehrich is a 2005 magna cum laude graduate of William Mitchell
College of Law. Mr. Ehrich clerked for the Honorable Sam Hanson in 2005–2006,
and he is currently practicing law at Leonard, Street and Deinard, P.A. in
Minneapolis.
1. Associate Justice, Minnesota Supreme Court, 2002–2007. Prior to joining
the court, Justice Hanson was a trial lawyer for thirty-four years and a judge on the
Minnesota Court of Appeals for two years. Justice Hanson recently announced his
retirement from the court to return to private practice at Briggs and Morgan in
Minneapolis.
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accused, interpreting intricate statutory provisions, applying the
common law, or setting the scope and limits of the division of
governmental powers, Justice Hanson’s passion for his work,
attention to detail, careful deliberation, and impartial judgment
are apparent in each of his opinions.
I.

CRIMINAL LAW

A. Constitutional Rights
The Minnesota Supreme Court has a celebrated history of
interpreting its state constitution more broadly than the United
States Constitution where “language, concerns, and traditions
unique to Minnesota” justify extending additional rights to
2
Minnesota citizens. Justice Hanson played an integral role in this
function on several important occasions. His majority opinion in
3
Deegan v. State is one such example.
Minnesota has a unique right of first appellate review by
postconviction proceeding where a convicted defendant claims that
“the conviction was obtained or that the sentence or other
disposition made violated [his] rights under the constitution or
4
laws of the United States or of the state.” A 2003 statute attempted
to ease the financial burden on the public defenders’ office by
allowing it to refuse a request for postconviction counsel under
5
The issue in Deegan was whether this
certain circumstances.

2. Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 825 (Minn. 2005).
3. 711 N.W.2d 89 (Minn. 2006).
4. MINN. STAT. § 590.01, subdiv. 1 (2006). Section 590.01 was enacted in
1967 in response to the United States Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari
in Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965), which suggested that “a convicted
defendant is entitled to at least one state corrective process to determine a claim
of violation of Federal constitutional rights.” State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 251,
243 N.W.2d 737, 740 (1976). Because section 590.01 permits review of state law
violations in addition to state and federal constitutional violations, it provides
broader grounds for relief than is arguably required by Case. Id.
5. MINN. STAT. § 590.05 (2004). The statute provided in relevant part:
If, however, the person pled guilty and received a presumptive sentence
or a downward departure in sentence, and the state public defender
reviewed the person's case and determined that there was no basis for an
appeal of the conviction or of the sentence, then the state public
defender may decline to represent the person in a postconviction remedy
case.
Id. This 2003 amended language was declared unconstitutional and was severed
from the language of section 590.05 by Deegan, 711 N.W.2d at 98.
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limitation on the right to postconviction counsel violated the
6
Minnesota Constitution.
7
Writing for the five justice majority, Justice Hanson compared
the Minnesota Postconviction Remedy Act and four decades of
Minnesota interpretative law with the nature of postconviction
8
remedies in other jurisdictions. After recognizing the unique
nature of Minnesota’s “broad right of review in a first review by
9
postconviction proceeding,” the court explained that “under the
Minnesota Constitution . . . a defendant’s access to the other
protections afforded in criminal proceedings cannot be
10
Justice Hanson
meaningful without the assistance of counsel.”
wrote:
Although we recognize the salutary purpose of the 2003
amendment—to direct the limited public defender
resources to the cases that will likely present the greatest
need—we nevertheless conclude that the 2003
amendment deprives some defendants of meaningful
access to one review of a criminal conviction, in violation
of their right to the assistance of counsel under Article I,
section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution. We hold that a
defendant’s right to the assistance of counsel under
Article I, section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution extends
to one review of a criminal conviction, whether by direct
appeal or a first review by postconviction proceeding. We
therefore hold that section 590.05, as amended by Act of
May 28, 2003, ch. 2, art. 3, § 2, 2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec.
11
Sess. 1400, 1401, is unconstitutional.
Extending greater protections to citizens through
constitutional interpretation often involves a careful balance
between fundamental individual freedoms and significant
governmental interests. In Deegan, the court elevated the right to
12
postconviction counsel over fiscal concerns of the government.
More difficult issues arise when the competing governmental
6. Deegan, 711 N.W.2d at 97.
7. Justice Gildea took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Justice G. Barry Anderson filed a dissenting opinion.
8. Deegan, 711 N.W.2d at 93–94. The United States Supreme Court has yet
to definitively answer the question of whether the right to counsel extends to a
first review by postconviction proceeding. Id.
9. Id. at 94.
10. Id. at 98.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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interest is crime control. Justice Hanson’s majority opinion in State
13
v. Carter is a unique example of the court’s attempt to maintain
this delicate balance.
The issue in Carter was whether a police-dog drug sniff—which
14
courts have generally held to not be a “search” —became a search
when conducted in the less private setting of a self-storage rental
15
unit. Normally, when a particular activity is classified as a search,
police are required to have probable cause and a search warrant
(or satisfy an exception to the search warrant requirement) prior to
16
conducting that activity.
Conversely, when an activity is not
classified as a search, police are generally allowed to conduct the
17
activity without any level of suspicion.
But the Carter decision broke this mold. Writing for the court,
Justice Hanson recognized the heightened privacy interests
implicated by self-storage units; but at the same time he
acknowledged “the government has a significant interest in the use
18
of drug-detection dogs in aid of law enforcement.” The solution
13. 697 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 2005).
14. This is true under both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions.
The United States Supreme Court has, on at least two occasions, held that a dog
sniff is not a Fourth Amendment search. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409
(2005) (holding that a dog sniff of a vehicle is not a Fourth Amendment search);
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding that a dog sniff of
luggage in an airport was not a Fourth Amendment search). Similarly, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has held that a dog sniff around a lawfully stopped
vehicle was not a search under either the United States or Minnesota
Constitutions. State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 133 (Minn. 2002). But the
Wiegand court concluded that even though not a search, a dog sniff of a vehicle at
a police traffic stop required reasonable articulable suspicion because it extended
the duration of the seizure. Id. at 135.
15. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 209–10. Although the United States Supreme Court
has not addressed the precise issue of whether a dog sniff of a self-storage unit is a
search, it has held that a dog sniff of a vehicle lawfully seized on a public roadway
is not a search. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409. Moreover, the Carter court noted that “all
of the state and lower federal court decisions that have addressed that issue have
concluded that a dog sniff outside a storage unit is not a search under the Fourth
Amendment.” Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 208 (citations omitted). Thus, the Carter
court concluded that “a drug-detection dog sniff in the area immediately outside a
self-storage unit is not a search under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 209.
16. Id. at 211.
17. See Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 133. There are exceptions to this general rule,
such as when the activity extends the duration of an otherwise lawful seizure
without a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity justifying the extension. Id. at
136.
18. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 211–12. An earlier Justice Hanson majority decision
acknowledged similar heightened privacy interests in self-storage units despite
their “commercial” nature and the often broad right of the landlord to enter and
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was for the three-justice plurality to create a “middle ground”
standard that “balances a person’s expectation of privacy against
19
the government’s interest in using dogs to detect illegal drugs.”
This hybrid approach classifies a dog sniff of a self-storage unit as a
20
search, but only requires that the officer articulate a “reasonable
21
suspicion” of drug activity.
The court adopted this standard,
which is lower than probable cause, from Fourth Amendment
22
seizure law.
Carter is a significant decision because of the implications for
other less intrusive law enforcement activities—such as facial
recognition software, thermal imaging devices, breath alcohol
content detection devices, and other technologies yet to be
developed—used in other quasi-public locations, such as parked
vehicles, school lockers, student book bags, and travel luggage.
Because of the harsh consequences on either side of the traditional
inspect the units. See State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243, 249–50 (Minn. 2003)
(holding permission from landlord was ineffective to satisfy the consent exception
to the search warrant requirement).
19. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 211. This middle ground approach caused sharp
division among the court. Justice Russell Anderson dissented, arguing that a dog
sniff is not a search. Id. at 212–15 (Anderson, Russell, J., dissenting). Justice Page
and Chief Justice Blatz focused on the heightened privacy interest in storage units
and would have required probable cause and thus a search warrant prior to
conducting a dog sniff. Id. at 212 (Page, J., concurring specially). Justice G. Barry
Anderson was not a member of the court at the time of submission and thus took
no part in the decision.
20. Justice Hanson was careful to “specifically limit” the scope of the decision
to drug-detecting dogs, noting that the court was expressing “no opinion
regarding bomb-detection dogs, as to which the special needs of law enforcement
might well be significantly greater.” Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 211 n.8. Justice Hanson
later wrote a lengthy concurring opinion in a case involving the admission of dogsniff evidence at a civil trial. Jacobson v. $55,900 in U.S. Currency, 728 N.W.2d
510, 531 (Minn. 2007) (Hanson, J., concurring). He identified “two serious layers
of subjectivity involved in dog sniff evidence,” and concluded that while “a dog’s
alert may provide probable cause to support a dog’s search,” such evidence should
be inadmissible at a civil forfeiture trial, in part, because of its imprecise,
unscientific nature. Id. at 533–36.
21. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 212.
22. When a police officer can articulate specific observations that led the
officer to reasonably believe that a person has committed, is committing, or is
about to commit a criminal offense, the officer may temporarily seize that person
in order to confirm or refute his or her suspicion. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21
(1968) (“[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to
point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”). In contrast, an
officer must have probable cause in order to make a full custodial arrest. See U.S.
CONST. amend. IV (providing that “no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause”).
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search versus no search dichotomy, the Carter court’s hybrid
standard is likely to gain popularity.
Justice Hanson led the court in another unique instance of
balancing interests protected by the Minnesota Constitution with
23
strong competing governmental interests in State v. Schmidt. The
Minnesota Supreme Court previously held that under the
Minnesota Constitution, a motorist has a right to counsel before
24
deciding whether to submit to chemical testing. The court also
permitted, in certain circumstances, collateral attacks on the
constitutionality of prior convictions to prevent the use of those
25
convictions for enhancement purposes. The issue in Schmidt was
whether the defendant could collaterally attack two South Dakota
DWI convictions, where (as in most states) there was no
constitutional right to counsel before submitting to chemical
26
testing.
Writing for the majority, Justice Hanson first concluded that
principles of conflict of laws and full faith and credit generally
require respect for and thus recognition of South Dakota’s final
27
judgments. But the court also recognized the competing interest
of enforcing the protections of the Minnesota Constitution, and
thus adopted a “very narrow” public policy exception to the general
rule of not allowing a collateral challenge to out-of-state
28
convictions. The court concluded that, although a constitutional
right, the right to pre-chemical test counsel is “more limited in
nature” than other constitutional rights, due in part to its many
23. 712 N.W.2d 530 (Minn. 2006).
24. Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 835 (Minn. 1991).
25. See, e.g., State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901, 905 (Minn. 1983). The
defendant in Nordstrom argued that his offense could not be enhanced by his prior
DWI conviction because the prior conviction contained no record that he made a
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. Id. at 903. The
supreme court held that “[a]bsent that valid waiver on the record of defendant’s
right to counsel, the misdemeanor DWI conviction based on an uncounseled plea
of guilty cannot be used as the basis of a gross misdemeanor charge.” Id. at 905.
26. Schmidt, 712 N.W.2d at 534.
27. Id. at 536–37. The court explained that this was because “the right to
counsel for a test decision under the Minnesota Constitution is only triggered by a
prosecution in Minnesota,” and thus South Dakota has a greater interest in
governing the “police conduct of the traffic stop, arrest, and ultimate test
decision.” Id. at 536.
28. Id. at 537. The court borrowed this exception from the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 103 (1971) (“A judgment rendered in one State
of the United States need not be recognized or enforced in a sister State if such
recognition . . . would involve an improper interference with important interests
of the sister State.”).
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29

exceptions. Thus, the court held that foreign convictions may be
used to enhance a Minnesota offense even if based on an
uncounseled chemical test decision that would violate Friedman if
30
taken in Minnesota.
These decisions demonstrate Justice Hanson’s active but
cautious approach to interpreting the Minnesota Constitution. His
work reflects his objectivity and careful deliberation over issues that
implicate one of the more controversial and important debates in
our democratic society: balancing individual freedoms with crime
control. Moreover, his exercise of judicial restraint in confining
holdings to their facts—often manifested in his frequent statements
about what the court is not holding—does not detract from the
practicality of his opinions. His well-reasoned, understandable, and
logical decisions leave practitioners with little doubt as to the scope
of the rule of law established therein, as well as provide useful
31
frameworks for future application.
29. Schmidt, 712 N.W.2d at 538–39. While noting hesitation to “distinguish
between the importance of constitutional rights,” Justice Hanson characterized
this as a “unique case” that justified such prioritization. Id. at 538 n.4.
30. Id. at 539. The court was careful to note that it was expressing no opinion
on the use of foreign convictions obtained under circumstances that would have
violated the right to counsel in Minnesota in other contexts. Id. at 537–38. Thus,
in State v. Borst, the Minnesota Supreme Court departed from most other
jurisdictions in recognizing the right to counsel for indigents facing misdemeanor
charges, even if there is no possibility of imprisonment. 278 Minn. 388, 154
N.W.2d 888 (1967). The Schmidt court also noted that it did not believe it
necessary “to determine whether the public policy exception would apply to a
foreign conviction that is based on an uncounseled plea and that would violate
Borst if it had been taken in Minnesota.” 712 N.W.2d at 537–38.
31. See also, e.g., Wanzek Constr., Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 679
N.W.2d 322 (Minn. 2004). Wanzek involved the interpretation of clause in a
standard form commercial general liability policy of insurance that provided
coverage for damage to the insured’s work only if the damage arose out of the
work of the insured’s “subcontractor.” Noting that the term “subcontractor” had
no policy definition and did not incorporate any statutory or regulatory definition
of the term, Justice Hanson (writing for the majority) explained that the term was
ambiguous, and thus had to be construed broadly and in favor of coverage.
Although the court chose to find that the materials supplier at issue was a
“subcontractor” based on the unique facts presented in the case, Justice Hanson’s
concise and articulate explanation of the court’s holding resulted in a useful, two
part test for interpreting this standard insurance policy clause: “We hold that
where, as here, a supplier custom fabricates the materials to the owner’s
specifications and provides on-site services in connection with the installation, the
supplier meets the definition of subcontractor under the exception to the ‘your
works’ exclusion.” Id. at 329. Demonstrating the practicality of this holding, this
author recently litigated an insurance coverage case that was centered entirely
around Justice Hanson’s formulation of the subcontractor test from Wanzek. See
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B. Waiver of Constitutional Rights
While Justice Hanson was one of the more moderate members
of the court when addressing issues of constitutional interpretation,
he took a more aggressive approach when faced with issues
pertaining to waiver of constitutional rights. Whether writing for a
unanimous court or in a solo dissent, Justice Hanson has
unequivocally taken the position that constitutional rights cannot
be denied by anything short of a knowing, voluntarily, and
intelligent waiver.
32
In State v. Caulfield, the court unanimously agreed that the
admission of a drug test lab report, in lieu of live testimony by the
lab technician who performed the analysis, violated the defendant’s
33
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. But the state argued
that the defendant waived his right to confrontation by failing to
comply with a Minnesota “notice-and-demand statute,” which
required the defendant to give the state notice at least ten days
34
prior to trial if he or she wanted live testimony from an analyst.
This issue divided the court. Justice Hanson drew the majority in
concluding that:
[A]lthough there may be legitimate public policy reasons
to advance the time to assert confrontation rights to a
reasonable time before trial, such a shift cannot be
constitutionally accomplished without adequate notice to
the defendant that his failure to request the testimony of
the analysis will result in the waiver of his confrontation
rights, especially when the report is offered to prove an
element of the offense with which the defendant is
35
charged.
The court explained that without notice of the report’s
contents and the consequence for failing to request testimony,
“there is no reasonable basis to conclude that a defendant’s failure

Web Constr., Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 06-5061, 2007 WL 4230751 (D. Minn.
Nov. 29, 2007).
32. 722 N.W.2d 304, 306–07 (Minn. 2006).
33. Id. at 306–07.
34. MINN. STAT. § 634.15, subdiv. 2 (2004). The statute at issue permitted the
admission of “a report of the facts and results of any laboratory analysis or
examination if it is prepared and attested by the person performing the analysis or
examination in any laboratory operated by the Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension.” Id. at subdiv. 1(a)(1).
35. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 313.
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to request the testimony constituted a knowing, intelligent, and
36
voluntary waiver of his confrontation rights.”
37
State v. Licari involved the ability of a police officer to search a
rented storage locker based on the consent of a landlord who had
the contractual right to enter the storage unit for “inspection”
38
Writing for the majority, Justice Hanson first
purposes.
distinguished between consent by a co-inhabitant, which can be
39
effective, and consent by a landlord, which is generally ineffective.
The court then rejected the state’s argument that the officer was
justified in relying on the landlord’s apparent authority to conduct
40
the search. Justice Hanson wrote:
While searches based on honest, reasonable mistakes of
fact are unobjectionable under the Fourth Amendment, a
police officer’s mistake of search and seizure law (here, a
mistake as to the legal requirements for the authority of a
landlord to consent to a search) cannot be reasonable.
“Otherwise, the protections of the Fourth Amendment
would be effectively limited to what the average police
41
officer believed was reasonable.”
It is reassuring, to say the least, that a citizen does not waive a
constitutional right simply because a police officer made an
incorrect on-the-spot interpretation of search and seizure law.
Another waiver case produced the rare occasion for
companion dissents by Justice Hanson and now Chief Justice
42
Russell Anderson. The majority in Spann v. State held that, after
conviction and sentencing, a defendant cannot waive the right to
43
appeal. In dissent, Justice Anderson noted the importance of plea
bargaining in our criminal justice system and argued that
36. Id. Justice G. Barry Anderson filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that
although the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension lab report was testimonial, the
defendant waived his right to confrontation by failing to request live testimony. Id.
at 317–19 (Anderson, G. Barry, J., dissenting). Justices Russell Anderson and
Gildea joined in his dissent.
37. 659 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 2003).
38. Id. at 251–52.
39. Id. at 252.
40. Id. at 254.
41. Id. (quoting Peterson v. People, 939 P.2d 824, 831 (Colo. 1997)).
42. 704 N.W.2d 486 (Minn. 2005).
43. Id. at 493. Citing numerous public policy and due process considerations,
the majority explained that even a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of
the right to appeal offends the integrity of the judicial system, allows the state to
take advantage of the disparity in bargaining power, and allows the state “to hide
its own misconduct and errors.” Id. at 493–94.
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“institutional concerns related to the integrity of a conviction
obtained by plea agreement or by trial are equally important” to
44
the integrity of a conviction obtained by jury trial. Because plea
bargaining is fundamental to our criminal justice system, Justice
Anderson would have remanded for a “comprehensive inquiry by
the district court” as to whether Mr. Spann’s waiver was knowing,
45
intelligent, and voluntary. Justice Hanson agreed that the right to
appeal can be waived, but would have gone further and concluded
that the facts of the case supported a finding of a knowing,
46
voluntary, and intelligent waiver as a matter of law. Alternatively,
Justice Hanson would have concluded that even if the waiver were
invalid, the appropriate remedy was to challenge the effectiveness
of his counsel in securing a proper waiver in a postconviction
47
proceeding.
C. Evidentiary Rules
Rights contained in the rules of evidence are often as
important to the fairness of a trial as constitutional rights
themselves. For example, courts have long recognized that direct
evidence of a third party’s commission of a crime (direct third48
party perpetrator evidence) is admissible under Rule 402. The

44. Id. at 495–96 (Anderson, Russell, J., dissenting). Justice Anderson also
pointed out the ironic result of the majority’s decision: a criminal defendant can
waive almost any constitutional right, but not the statutory right to appeal. Id. at 495.
45. Id. at 497.
46. Id. at 497–98 (Hanson, J., dissenting). The defendant was represented by
counsel, was fully aware of the precise issues on appeal, signed a letter drafted by
his attorney waiving his rights, and stated on the record that he was aware of his
rights and was voluntarily waiving them. Id. at 497–98.
47. Id. at 498–99. When accepting a plea bargain, the rules of criminal
procedure require the court to make detailed inquiry as to the validity of the
waiver of trial rights. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.01 (2008). Justice Russell Anderson
would have imposed similar requirements on the district court for waivers of
appeal rights. Spann, 704 N.W.2d at 497 (Anderson, Russell, J., dissenting).
Justice Hanson did not believe the district court’s failure to inquire was fatal to the
waiver. Id. at 498 (Hanson, J., dissenting). Instead, he would have shifted the
burden to the defendant to “challenge his appeal waiver [in a postconviction
proceeding] by alleging facts showing that his waiver was the product of ineffective
assistance of counsel or was otherwise not knowing, intelligent or voluntary.” Id.
48. State v. Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d 150, 158 (Minn. 1977). MINNESOTA RULES
OF EVIDENCE 402 (2004) provides, “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the United States Constitution, the State Constitution,
statute, by these rules, or by other rules applicable in the courts of this state.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.” Evidence that a third party
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more difficult issue is when a defendant can submit evidence of a
third party’s prior bad acts to suggest that the third party also
49
committed the charged offense.
This “reverse-Spreigl evidence”
presents a tension between honoring the defendant’s right to
present potentially exonerating evidence and avoiding collateral
50
trials on irrelevant character evidence of third parties.
Accordingly, the Minnesota Supreme Court has required a
51
heightened standard for the admission of reverse-Spreigl evidence.
Applying this reverse-Spreigl standard and separating reverseSpreigl from direct third-party perpetrator evidence has divided the
court on several occasions during Justice Hanson’s tenure. Facing
charges related to the death of a child under his care, the
defendant in State v. Gutierrez attempted to introduce evidence of a
third party’s (1) history of abusing children and (2) presence at the
52
While
home where the child died around the time of death.
acknowledging that the district court improperly blended the
53
standards for reverse-Spreigl and third-party perpetrator evidence,
the majority nonetheless affirmed the district court’s exclusion of
the evidence because its potential for unfair prejudice outweighed
committed the crime is obviously relevant to the issue of whether the charged
defendant committed the crime.
49. E.g., State v. Bock, 229 Minn. 449, 458, 39 N.W.2d 887, 892 (1949) (A
criminal defendant “should . . . have the right to show that crimes of a similar
nature have been committed by some other person when the acts of such other
person are so closely connected in point of time and method of operation as to
cast doubt upon the identification of defendant as the person who committed the
crime charged against him.”).
50. Spreigl evidence is evidence of other crimes or bad acts offered by the state
as evidence that the defendant committed the crime in question. State v. Johnson,
568 N.W.2d 426, 432 (Minn. 1997); State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 495, 139
N.W.2d 167, 172 (1965). Reverse-Spreigl evidence is character evidence offered by
the defendant as evidence that a third party committed the charged crime. State
v. Williams, 593 N.W.2d 227, 233 (Minn. 1999). See also State v. Deans, 356 N.W.2d
674, 676 (Minn. 1984).
51. The foundational requirements for admission of reverse-Spreigl evidence
are: “(1) clear and convincing evidence that the defendant participated in the
Spreigl incident; (2) that the Spreigl evidence is relevant and material to the state's
case; and (3) that the probative value of the Spreigl evidence outweighs its potential
for unfair prejudice.” Johnson, 568 N.W.2d at 433.
52. State v. Gutierrez, 667 N.W.2d 426, 436–37 (Minn. 2003).
53. The district court applied a clear and convincing standard—the first
prong of the reverse-Spreigl test—to the second prong of the test: relevance and
materiality. Id. at 437. The district court concluded that the defendant failed to
satisfy the second prong because he did not establish the relevance of the history
of child abuse—which was the third party’s presence at the home at the time of
death—by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
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54

its probative value. Justice Hanson filed a concurring opinion in
which he agreed that the third party’s history of child abuse was
properly excluded reverse-Spreigl evidence, but clarified that the
evidence of the third party’s presence at the home was admissible
55
as direct third-party perpetrator evidence. He identified that the
confusion in this case arose because third-party perpetrator
evidence “serves both as exculpatory evidence for the defendant
and as foundation evidence for the use of reverse-Spreigl
56
evidence.”
57
In State v. Richardson, Justices Hanson and Meyer again
58
The
departed from the majority on a reverse-Spreigl issue.
defendant wanted to testify that a third party fired the fatal shot
and that this third party had motive and intent to do so as
59
demonstrated by her abusive relationship with the deceased. The
majority affirmed the exclusion of this evidence because it did not
satisfy the reverse-Spreigl standard and, alternatively, because any
60
error in its admission was harmless. Justice Hanson disagreed,
explaining that the defendant’s eyewitness testimony was clearly
admissible because it was more properly classified as direct third61
party perpetrator evidence (not reverse-Spreigl evidence). As for
the true reverse-Spreigl evidence, Justice Hanson would have
remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether it was
62
adequately connected to the charged offense.
54. Id. at 437–38. More specifically, the court held that the evidence “has
limited probative value and serves no purpose other than to attempt to persuade
the jury that [the third party] was in some way responsible for [the child’s] death
merely because she was not an ideal mother.” Id.
55. Id. at 440 (Hanson, J., concurring). As for the past history of child abuse,
Justice Hanson actually would have gone further and held that all three prongs of
the reverse-Spreigl test had not been satisfied. Id. Justice Meyer joined in Justice
Hanson’s concurrence.
56. Id. at 439. Justice Hanson ultimately concluded that the district court’s
reverse-Spreigl analysis was harmless error because it technically did not prevent
the defendant from offering evidence of the third party’s presence at the home.
Id. at 440.
57. 670 N.W.2d 267 (Minn. 2003).
58. Id. at 289 (Hanson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). This time,
Justice Hanson would have remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the
admissibility of the evidence. Id.
59. Id. at 274–75 (majority opinion).
60. Id. at 277–80.
61. Id. at 289–90 (Hanson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The
majority did not specifically address the admissibility of the defendant’s own
eyewitness testimony.
62. Id. at 290. Justice Hanson would have concluded that the reverse-Spreigl
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D. Substantive Criminal Law
Justice Hanson also made important contributions in the area
63
of substantive criminal law. In State v. Edwards, he achieved the
rare feat of effecting a change in a pattern criminal jury instruction
64
through a dissenting opinion.
On appeal from a first-degree
murder conviction, Edwards argued that the district court erred in
giving a pattern jury instruction that inaccurately stated the
common law rule regarding conduct that forfeits a defendant’s
65
right to act in self-defense. The instruction allowed the jury to
conclude that Edwards had no right to defend himself if he “began
or induced the incident that led to the necessity of using force in
66
the defendant’s own defense.” Although Edwards’ conviction was
affirmed by a majority of the court, Justice Hanson drew a separate
67
majority in his conclusion that the jury instruction was legally
inaccurate because (1) it did not contain a causal nexus between
the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the victim’s use of deadly
force, and (2) “it d[id] not require a finding that the defendant
68
After
was in some way culpable in beginning the ‘incident.’”
evidence was admissible because the state opened the door to character evidence
by eliciting positive character evidence of the relationship between the deceased
and the third party. Id. at 291.
63. 717 N.W.2d 405 (Minn. 2006).
64. Id. at 414 (Hanson, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 410 (plurality opinion).
66. Id. The instruction in its entirety provided:
If the defendant began or induced the incident that led to the necessity
of using force in the defendant’s own defense, the right to stand the
defendant’s ground and thus defend himself is not immediately available
to him. Instead, the defendant must first have declined to carry on the
affray and have honestly tried to escape from it, and must clearly and
fairly have informed the adversary of a desire for peace and of
abandonment of the contest. Only after the defendant has done that will
the law justify the defendant in thereafter standing his ground and using
force against the other person.
Id. (quoting 10 MINN. DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, MINNESOTA PRACTICE—JURY INSTRUCTION
GUIDES, CRIMINAL, CRIMJIG 7.07 (4th ed. 1999)).
67. Three justices believed the jury instruction accurately stated the law and
was not in need of revision. 717 N.W.2d at 412. Two justices joined in Justice
Hanson’s dissent. The swing vote came from Justice Paul Anderson, who agreed
with Justice Hanson that “CRIMJIG 7.07 . . . [might have] misstate[d] the law and
[was] in need of revision,” but agreed with “the majority’s alternative conclusion
that any error in the submission of the instruction was harmless.” Id. at 414
(Anderson, Paul, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 416 (Hanson, J., dissenting). In other words, Justice Hanson
explained that the conduct forfeiting the right to act in self-defense must have
been wrongful and must have provoked or otherwise caused the victim’s violent
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analyzing self-defense forfeiture instructions in other states and
instructions proposed in legal commentary, Justice Hanson offered
a much simpler and more logical instruction:
I would conclude that the right of self-defense is forfeited
where the victim’s use of deadly force was legally justified,
that is, where the victim’s application of deadly force was
“necessary in resisting or preventing an offense which the
[victim] reasonably believe[d] expose[d] the [victim] . . .
69
to great bodily harm or death.”
Justice Hanson’s dissent in Edwards resulted in a change to the
70
pattern jury instruction.
Edwards was also unique because the
legislature specifically left the development of this area of
71
substantive criminal law to the judiciary. But where the legislature
has addressed an area of substantive criminal law, Justice Hanson’s
opinions demonstrate deference and restraint.
II. SEPARATION OF POWERS
Separation of powers is a particularly sensitive subject in this
age when judges are routinely accused of legislating from the
response. The instruction did not make clear that innocent behaviors, such as
beginning a conversation or glaring at the victim, are insufficient to justify selfdefense forfeiture. In short, the instruction inadequately described what conduct
justified forfeiture, thus presenting the danger that the jury would find innocent
conduct justified forfeiture.
69. Id. at 420 (alteration in original). This instruction contains the requisite
culpability because if the victim had the right to act in self-defense, the defendant
was necessarily acting wrongfully. The causal nexus is also satisfied by this
formulation because the victim could have only been legally justified to act in selfdefense if the defendant performed some unlawful act that caused the victim to
reasonably fear great bodily harm or death.
70. The Committee on Criminal Jury Instruction Guides declined to adopt
Justice Hanson’s formulation of the instruction. Instead, it substituted the word
“incident” with the word “assault,” concluding that this change “incorporates the
policy choices discussed in Justice Hanson’s dissent and recognizes the reasonable
beliefs of the victim in responding to defendant’s initial assault.” 10 MINN. DIST.
JUDGES ASS’N, MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES: JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES—CRIMINAL §
7.07 cmt. (5th ed. 2007). While this formulation may contain the requisite causal
nexus, it fails to require that the victim’s violent response (i.e. the conduct
necessitating the use of deadly force) be commensurate with the actor’s conduct
that began the assault. By permitting a finding of self-defense forfeiture even
though the victim responded with a disproportionate level of force, the
amendment to section 7.07 probably does not adequately address Justice Hanson’s
culpability concern. For example, a person could start a fistfight but not be legally
justified in defending himself if the other party began unlawfully using a firearm.
71. See MINN. STAT. § 609.06 cmt. (2006). “Such questions are left for judicial
development . . . .” Id.
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bench simply because the accuser happens to disagree with the
result. While judicial activism (when truly present) is regrettable,
abdicating judicial responsibilities out of fear of public perception
can be equally repugnant. Justice Hanson cannot be accused of
either. His decisions reveal his care in recognizing and giving
effect to the sometimes ultra-fine distinctions among the respective
roles of the three branches of government. Additionally, they
demonstrate his deference where the legislature has acted, his
rigorous defense for the judiciary’s role in governing the common
law where the legislature has not acted, and his judicial restraint
when defining the implied or “inherent” powers of the court.
A. Legislative Functions
72

The majority of the court in State v. Smith reversed a
conviction for first-degree murder while committing kidnapping
because fairness required “that confinement or removal must be
criminally significant in the sense of being more than merely
incidental to the underlying crime, in order to justify a separate
73
criminal sentence.” Noting the legislature’s “exclusive authority
to define crimes and offenses,” Justice Hanson dissented, stating
the crime of kidnapping “include[s] confinement or removal that
is minimal and that may even be completely incidental to another
74
facilitated offense.”
Justice Hanson recognized that this could
produce harsh results, but instead of reversing a conviction based
on the similarity of the two offenses, Justice Hanson would have
held that the incidental nature of the crime should only be a factor
75
As to the
in the district court’s sentencing determination.
72. 669 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 2003).
73. Id. at 32. In State v. Earl, the court had occasion to apply this criminally
significant/merely incidental standard. Writing for the majority, Justice Hanson
concluded that the confinement and removal of a family in a home “may have
been necessary to commit the burglary,” but was not merely incidental because of
the defendant’s purposeful behavior of awaking the family, binding them with
electrical tape, and standing by while his accomplice burglarized the house. 702
N.W.2d 711, 722–23 (Minn. 2005).
74. Smith, 669 N.W.2d at 35–36 (Hanson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
75. Id. at 38. The crime of rape necessarily involves confinement of a person,
and thus a kidnapping. Under Justice Hanson’s approach, though the perpetrator
could be convicted of both crimes, the district court should examine the specific
facts of the case and decline to impose consecutive sentences if doing so would
unduly exaggerate the criminality of his conduct or be otherwise unreasonable or
excessive. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 244.11, subdiv. 2(b) (2002)). Because the
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argument that prosecutors could abuse their charging discretion if
the definition of kidnapping is not limited, Justice Hanson
explained that these concerns “cannot be addressed by changing
the legislature’s definition of the crime but only by exercising the
court’s supervisory powers to prevent sentences that ‘are
76
unreasonable, inappropriate, excessive or unjustifiably disparate.’”
Thus, Justice Hanson’s approach would have achieved the same
fairness concerns as the majority, but in a manner that perhaps
more appropriately recognizes the role of the legislature in
defining crimes and offenses.
B. Executive Functions
In an issue of first impression, the court in Schermer v. State
77
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. was asked to apply the federal “filed-rate
doctrine” to dismiss a suit challenging the legality of an insurance
78
company’s rate structure filed with a state executive agency.
Writing for the majority, Justice Hanson examined the history of
79
and the policy considerations underlying the filed-rate doctrine.
The court concluded that the traditional rationales for the federal
filed-rate doctrine—justiciability, separation of powers, and
legislative intent—applied equally to the Minnesota insurance
appellant did not raise this argument, Justice Hanson would have affirmed the
conviction. Id.
A short time later, an appellant did in fact argue that his sentence unduly
exaggerated the criminality of his conduct partly because his kidnapping
conviction was based on minimal confinement. State v. Welch, 675 N.W.2d 615,
621 (Minn. 2004). Relying on Smith, the majority reversed the kidnapping
conviction altogether. Id. As in Smith, Justice Hanson filed a dissenting opinion
indicating that instead of reversing the kidnapping conviction, he would modify
the 45 month sentence for kidnapping to run concurrently (instead of
consecutively) with the 150 month sentence for attempted criminal sexual
conduct. Id. (Hanson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
76. Smith, 669 N.W.2d at 35 (Hanson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
77. 721 N.W.2d 307 (Minn. 2006).
78. Id. at 314. Generally, the filed-rate doctrine prevents the judiciary from
reviewing the reasonableness or legality of a rate filed with and approved by an
agency within the executive branch. See Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 260 U.S.
156, 163–64 (1922). Rationales for the doctrine include: (1) the judiciary being
ill-suited to second-guess the decisions of regulatory agencies; (2) the inability of
the judiciary to calculate damages because of the highly specialized nature of
setting rates for regulated industries; (3) deference to legislative intent to confine
rate-making authority to the executive branch; and (4) considerations of
separation of powers. See Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 311–13.
79. Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 311–13.
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80

regulatory scheme.
No doubt drawing from Justice Hanson’s
thirty-four years of experience practicing in the area of regulated
81
utilities, the court provided unique insight into another rationale
for the doctrine that has apparently not been articulated by any
other court:
[W]hen a regulatory agency approves rates, it seeks to
achieve a balance by assuring that the rates are not
excessive for ratepayers but yet are adequate to satisfy the
regulated entity’s due process right to earn a reasonable
return. And, for insurance rates specifically, “[r]ate
regulation is designed to generate premium charges that
are equitable for each policyholder-insured as well as yield
insurers a fair return for the risks undertaken.” When a
court is asked to determine whether one part of the rate
structure is unlawful, as applied to a subset of ratepayers,
it must necessarily interfere with the function delegated
by the legislature to the DOC, and it has neither the
expertise nor the mechanisms to deal with the entire rate
structure or the adequacy of the return to the regulated
82
entity.
Thus, the court refrained from infringing on the executive
branch’s quasi-legislative function of designing and governing rates
for regulated industries.
83
Kmart Corp. v. County of Stearns involved the scope of the
legislature’s delegation of quasi-judicial powers to the executive
branch. The core issue in Kmart was whether the supreme court’s
interpretation of a statute should only be applied prospectively
because the tax court had interpreted the same statute differently
84
in prior cases. The supreme court has previously recognized this
purely prospective ruling doctrine in very limited circumstances
when a court reverses clearly established precedent upon which
85
Writing for the majority, Justice Hanson
litigants have relied.

80. Id. at 315–17.
81. Id. at 314. Indeed, the Schermer majority relied in part on Hibbing Taconite
Co. v. Minnesota Public Service Commission, 302 N.W.2d 5 (Minn. 1980), a rate case in
which Justice Hanson participated as an attorney more than twenty-five years
before.
82. Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 314 (citations omitted).
83. 710 N.W.2d 761 (Minn. 2006).
84. Id. at 767.
85. Hoff v. Kempton, 317 N.W.2d 361, 363 (Minn. 1982). But even in
situations where clearly established precedent has been overruled, the court will
not apply the purely prospective ruling doctrine unless doing so is consistent with
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distinguished between the role of the tax court, which is an
administrative agency within the executive branch, and that of an
86
appellate court within the judicial branch. The court explained
that while stare decisis applies to the latter, decisions of the tax
87
Thus the court
court “have little, if any, precedential effect.”
concluded that even if these prior tax court decisions “could be
characterized as being ‘clearly established,’ . . . they do not qualify
as the type of ‘precedent’ on which litigants may rely for
88
retroactivity purposes.”
Although the Kmart court did not
explicitly identify separation of powers as a basis for its holding, the
same principals underlie its refusal to essentially give precedential
effect to an executive official’s interpretation of a statute while
acting in a quasi-judicial capacity.
C.

Judicial Functions
89

The district court in State v. Chauvin was faced with a unique
situation that required the supreme court’s clarification on the
demarcation between legislative and judicial functions in
sentencing criminal offenders. Although presented with evidence
of aggravating circumstances that would justify departure from the
presumptive guideline sentence, the mechanism for doing so had
90
been held unconstitutional. The defendant argued that absent
legislative authority to utilize a sentencing jury, the only option was

the purpose and history of the rule in question and the relative equities involved.
Id.
86. Kmart, 721 N.W.2d at 769.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 723 N.W.2d 20 (Minn. 2006).
90. The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines previously authorized a district
court judge (not a jury) to make findings on aggravating circumstances and to
impose an upward sentencing departure if it found the circumstances to exist by a
preponderance of the evidence. MINN. STAT. § 244.10 (2004). In Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004), the United States Supreme Court held that
the Washington Sentencing Guidelines, which were substantially similar to the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, violated an accused’s constitutional right to a
jury trial and proof of each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Relying on Blakely, the Minnesota Supreme Court subsequently struck down
Minnesota’s Sentencing Guidelines to the extent it “permit[ted] an upward
durational departure based on judicial findings.” State v. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d
131, 143 (Minn. 2005). Although the legislature later amended the guidelines to
authorize district courts to impanel sentencing juries to make findings on
sentencing factors, there was a gap of several months where district courts were
left with no guidance on how to impose sentencing departures.
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for the court to impose the presumptive guideline sentence. Not
persuaded, the district court impaneled a sentencing jury and
imposed an aggravated sentence based on the jury’s finding of the
92
existence of aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.
Writing for the majority, Justice Hanson described the historical
and constitutional role of the judiciary in determining court
procedural matters and safeguarding “the rights of criminal
93
Characteristic of Justice Hanson’s opinions, the
defendants.”
Chauvin court was careful to limit the scope of its holding to
situations where exercising the court’s inherent power did “the
least amount of damage” to a statutory scheme that had been
deemed partially unconstitutional and where exercising the power
“did not infringe on the legislative function of creating a
94
sentencing guideline system.”
91. Chauvin, 723 N.W.2d at 23. “[He] objected to any proceeding that would
result in a departure from the presumptive sentence of 24 months because there
were no rules or statutes authorizing the procedure that the court was
contemplating.” Id.
92. See id. (describing the procedure used by the district court).
93. Id. at 25–26.
94. Id. at 24–27. In reaching this conclusion, the court applied a three-part
test articulated in In re Clerk of Lyon County Courts' Compensation, 308 Minn. 172,
180–81, 241 N.W.2d 781, 786 (1976). Although many supreme court opinions
discussing the court’s inherent authority cite to the Lyon County test, most only
discuss the historical and constitutional authority for the court’s inherent powers
while ignoring the other two prongs of the test (necessity and whether it infringes
on a function of another branch of government). Justice Hanson’s strict
application of each prong of the Lyon County test is important to avoid overbroad
applications of the court’s inherent powers and to ensure proper allocation of
governmental powers.
By way of contrast, State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1996), is a
controversial example of the supreme court not applying all three prongs of the
Lyon County test. As background to the Krotzer decision, it is well-established that
absent evidence of selective or discriminatory intent, considerations of separation
of powers provide criminal prosecutors with absolute discretion in making
criminal charging determinations. See State v. Carriere, 290 N.W.2d 618, 620 n.3
(Minn. 1980); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (stating
that the decision whether or not to prosecute generally rests entirely with
prosecutor). In Krotzer, a 19-year-old man was charged with statutory rape for
having otherwise consensual sex with a 14-year-old. 548 N.W.2d at 253. The
child’s mother was aware of the incident and reached an amicable resolution
without police involvement that ultimately resulted in her consent to a non-sexual
relationship between the two. Id. Still, the state pressed charges. Despite the
prosecutor’s objection, the district court imposed a stay of adjudication of these
mitigating circumstances. Id. Relying on the distinction between the prosecutor’s
charging function and the district court’s sentencing function, the supreme court
affirmed. Id. at 254. But the court failed to take into account the unique nature
of a stay of adjudication, which essentially nullifies a charge after a certain period
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While sentencing involves a blend of judicial and legislative
functions, matters of court procedure are clearly for the courts.
State v. Lemmer involved a challenge to a legislative pronouncement
that affected a traditional judicial function: re-litigating issues that
95
have already been determined by a court. The statute at issue in
Lemmer prevented courts from applying the collateral estoppel
doctrine in a DWI proceeding, even though the issue had already
96
been determined in an implied consent proceeding. Although
acknowledging that collateral estoppel is a judicial function, the
majority upheld the statute as a matter of comity because the
elements of collateral estoppel are not satisfied by virtue of the fact
that the two proceedings are prosecuted by different parts of the
97
government. Justice Hanson dissented, arguing that the elements
of collateral estoppel were satisfied by a defendant who prevailed in
98
an implied consent proceeding. As to the constitutionality of the
statute, he examined the similarities between the two proceedings
and other public policy considerations, and concluded that:
[b]ecause the public policy considerations that underlie
the collateral estoppel doctrine are fundamental to the
judicial function, and the detriment to the state of being
of lawful behavior. By not focusing on the impact of the charging function of
executive branch officials, and by failing to clearly explain why the decision was
necessary to preserve a uniquely judicial function, the Krotzer decision has resulted
in significant confusion as to the scope of its application. Accordingly, Krotzer has
since been significantly limited in its application. See State v. Foss, 556 N.W.2d
540, 541 (Minn. 1996) (permitting a stay of adjudication over prosecutor’s
objection only “for the purpose of avoiding an injustice resulting from the
prosecutor's clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of the charging function.”)
(emphasis in original); see also State v. Streiff, 673 N.W.2d 831, 837 (Minn. 2004)
(Hanson, J., majority opinion) (recognizing the limitations of Krotzer).
95. 736 N.W.2d 650, 653 (Minn. 2007).
96. MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(g) (2006). In the implied consent
proceeding, the district court rescinded the revocation after concluding that the
police officer did not have a particularized and objective basis for stopping the
defendant. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 653–54. At his omnibus hearing during the
criminal proceedings, the defendant argued that section 169A.53 violated
separation of powers because preventing a party from re-litigating an issue already
decided is solely a judicial function. Id. at 654. The district court agreed,
declaring the statute unconstitutional and issuing an injunction that prevented the
state from enforcing the statute. Id.
97. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 662–63. The Attorney General represents the state
at implied consent hearings and the county attorney represents the state at the
criminal proceeding. One element of collateral estoppel is that the estopped
party must have been “a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication.”
Willems v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 333 N.W.2d 619, 621 (Minn. 1983).
98. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 665–70 (Hanson, J., dissenting).
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faced with collateral estoppel is only a matter of
inconvenience, not of fundamental right, I would not
defer to the legislature as a matter of comity. I would
hold that Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(g), is
unconstitutional and that the judgment in the implied
consent proceeding operates as collateral estoppel in the
DWI proceeding to establish that the stop of Lemmer was
unlawful and that the evidence obtained by that stop must
99
be suppressed.
III. JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR GOVERNING THE COMMON LAW
Application of the separation of powers doctrine to the
substantive common law is another controversial topic. The
judiciary has the responsibility to interpret and define the common
law even where doing so involves the traditionally legislative task of
100
But equally
weighing competing public policy considerations.
well-established is the principal that the legislature may abrogate or
101
change the common law.
The more difficult issue is whether a
statute that only partially governs a subject area justifies complete
deference to the legislature in that entire area. The general rule in
these circumstances is that statutes are presumed to be consistent
with the common law, “and if a statute abrogates the common law,
the abrogation must be by express wording or necessary
102
But application of this rule has divided the court
implication.”
on numerous occasions. In several split decisions, Justice Hanson
took a strong position favoring the judiciary’s role in governing and
advancing the common law unless the legislature has unequivocally
expressed its intent to the contrary.
103
His majority opinion in Rosenberg v. Heritage Renovations, LLC
illustrates this debate. The common law remedy of “procuring
cause” recognizes a right to commissions for real estate brokers
99. Id. at 674.
100. A recent example is Justice Hanson’s majority decision in Bjerke v. Johnson,
742 N.W.2d 660 (Minn. 2007). The core issue in Bjerke was whether a homeowner
had a “special relationship” with a child to whom she provided room, board, and a
stable home environment, such that the homeowner had a duty to protect the
child from sexual abuse by another adult resident. Id. at 662–63. The court
recognized the lack of opportunity for self-protection when a child lives away from
her parents for an extended period and, as a matter of public policy, held that the
homeowner owed the child a duty to protect her from sexual abuse. Id. at 665–66.
101. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 314 (Minn. 2000).
102. Id.
103. 685 N.W.2d 320 (Minn. 2004).
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who are the procuring cause of a sale, but who are not entitled to
commissions under the applicable listing agreement because the
104
agreement was terminated prior to the closing of the sale.
After
the supreme court first announced this equitable remedy, however,
the legislature enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme
governing real estate listing agreements and commissions in
105
More specifically, Minnesota Statutes section 82.195
general.
provided real estate brokers with an “override” right to
commissions even after termination of the listing agreement if
within 72 hours the broker provided the other party with a
“protective list,” which identified those who had made an
affirmative showing of interest in the property during the period of
106
the listing agreement.
The issue in Rosenberg was whether the
104. Id. at 327 (citing Spring Co. v. Holle, 248 Minn. 51, 55, 78 N.W.2d 315,
318 (1956)).
105. See generally MINN. STAT. Ch. 82 (2002). More specifically, section 82.195
generally governed the required content of listing agreements, including:
(1) a definite expiration date;
(2) a description of the real property involved;
(3) the list price and any terms required by the seller;
(4) the amount of any compensation or commission or the basis for
computing the commission;
(5) a clear statement explaining the events or conditions that will entitle a
broker to a commission;
(6) information regarding an override clause, if applicable, including a
statement to the effect that the override clause will not be effective unless
the licensee supplies the seller with a protective list within 72 hours after
the expiration of the listing agreement; [and]
....
(10) for residential listings, a notice stating that after the expiration of the
listing agreement, the seller will not be obligated to pay the licensee a
fee or commission if the seller has executed another valid listing
agreement pursuant to which the seller is obligated to pay a fee or
commission to another licensee for the sale, lease, or exchange of the
real property in question. This notice may be used in the listing
agreement for any other type of real estate.
MINN. STAT. § 82.195, subdiv. 2 (2002) (renumbered to MINN. STAT. § 82.21,
subdiv. 2 (2004)).
106. Id. See also Rosenberg, 685 N.W.2d at 327–30.
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statutory override remedy abrogated the common law procuring
107
Justice Hanson identified several reasons why
cause remedy.
section 82.195 did not abrogate the common law:
(1) “[S]ection 82.105 makes no explicit reference to the
procuring cause remedy and does not state that the
override remedy displaces any other remedies that
108
might be available at common law”;
(2) The “Scope and Effect” section of chapter 82 indicates
legislative intent to not abrogate any common law
109
remedy;
(3) Legislative enactments must be particularly clear in
order to abrogate an equitable remedy, which
functions “as a supplement to the rest of the law where
110
its remedies are inadequate to do complete justice”;
and
(4) The override remedy is listed as an optional
requirement of a listing agreement, which “does not
111
suggest an intention of exclusion.”
Thus, the court concluded that “the override remedy provided
in section 82.195 was intended to provide an alternative to, but not
to abrogate, the court’s equitable authority to use the procuring
112
cause remedy where necessary to do complete equity.”

107. Rosenberg, 685 N.W.2d at 327. Because the broker failed to demand an
override clause in the listing agreement, a determination that the statutory
override remedy was exclusive would have left the broker without any remedy. See
id. at 323–24.
108. Id. at 328.
109. Id. at 329.
110. Id. (citations omitted).
111. Id. at 330.
112. Id. Justice Russell Anderson dissented, arguing that “[w]hen the
legislature provides that events or conditions that will entitle a broker to a
commission must be explained in a ‘clear statement’ in the listing agreement, I
would conclude that a common law claim, neither mentioned nor explained by a
clear statement in a listing agreement, is barred.” Id. at 333 (Anderson, Russell, J.,
dissenting). Chief Justice Blatz joined in the dissent.
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A similar issue was presented in Brekke v. THM Biomedical,
The issue in Brekke was whether the existence of four
Inc.
enumerated statutory exceptions to a wage penalty statute
indicated the legislature’s intent to abrogate other common law
114
A narrow, Justice Hanson-led majority concluded that
defenses.
the statutory exceptions were insufficient for a finding of
115
abrogation “by express wording or necessary implication.”
The
court relied in part on a prior supreme court decision that held the
116
common law defense of forfeiture was available to employers. As
in Rosenberg, the court noted the presumption of no abrogation, the
court’s strong reluctance to find implied abrogation of equitable
remedies, the absence of an express reference to the common law
principles at issue, and no other evidence of legislative intent to
117
abrogate.
A third example involved the ability of the court to recognize
new common law rights in areas where the legislature had partially
spoken, but did not express a clear intent to abrogate all new
118
common law remedies. The issue in Larson v. Wasemiller was
whether Minnesota should recognize a new common law cause of
action against a hospital for negligently issuing credentials to
surgeons. Writing for the majority, Justice Hanson examined the
public policy considerations for and against, and concluded that
“the tort of negligent credentialing is inherent in and the natural
extension of well-established common law rights,” a holding that
113

113. 683 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 2004).
114. Id. at 775. The wage statute at issue provided for a penalty if an employer
made any deduction from an employee’s wages for lost or stolen property, for
damage to property, or to recover for a debt. MINN. STAT. § 181.79, subdiv. 1
(2004). The employee in Brekke was also an officer, director, and shareholder of
the closely-held corporation that deducted the loan amount from his salary. 683
N.W.2d at 772–73. The corporation did not argue that any of the four statutory
exceptions applied. Id. at 775. Instead, the corporation argued that the
employee’s own breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duties made the
common law affirmative defenses of waiver and estoppel applicable to bar the
employee’s claim. Id. at 776–77.
115. Brekke, 683 N.W.2d at 776–77 (quoting Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302,
314 (Minn. 2000)).
116. Id. at 775–76. The court discussed Stiff v. Associated Sewing Supply Co.,
where an employer argued that it was entitled to withhold wages because the
employee forfeited his right to rely on the wage statute by embezzling funds from
the employer. 436 N.W.2d 777, 780 (Minn. 1989). Although forfeiture is not an
enumerated statutory exception, the court found no legislative intent to abrogate
the common law defense of forfeiture. Id.
117. Brekke, 683 N.W.2d at 776.
118. 738 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. 2007).
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the court found to be consistent with the law in twenty-seven other
119
But the hospital argued that Minnesota’s “peer review
states.
statute”—which governs credentialing of medical professionals and
provides for certain limits on liability—abrogates any common law
claim for negligent credentialing because of certain conflicts
120
between the two. The court disagreed:
Although the plain language of . . . section 145.63 does
limit the liability of hospitals and credentials committees,
it in no way indicates intent to immunize hospitals, or to
abrogate a common law claim for negligent credentialing
. . . . If the legislature had intended to foreclose the
possibility of a cause of action for negligent credentialing,
it would not have addressed the standard of care
121
applicable to such an action.
Accordingly, the court adopted a new common law claim in
Minnesota.
Justice Hanson also weighed in on the highly publicized case
involving the impact of the Workers Compensation Act on an
injured employee’s common law right to recover from a co122
employee.
The legislature changed the common law by limiting
119. Id. at 303–09. These findings satisfy two of the four prongs in the test for
deciding whether to recognize a new common law tort: “(1) whether the tort is
inherent in, or the natural extension of, a well-established common law right,
[and] (2) whether the tort has been recognized in other common law states . . . .”
Id. at 304 (citing Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 234–36 (Minn.
1998)). The other two prongs are: “(3) whether recognition of a cause of action
will create tension with other applicable laws, and (4) whether such tension is outweighed by the importance of the additional protections that recognition of the
claim would provide to injured persons.” Id.
120. Id. at 309–11. The hospital relied on Minnesota Statutes section 145.64,
subdivision 1 (2006), which prohibits review organizations (such as the hospital)
from disclosing information revealed during a peer review proceeding. Id. at 309.
The hospital argued that if negligent credentialing were recognized, this statute
would prevent it from defending itself because it would not be able to disclose the
information that it knew at the time it issued the credentials. Id. The hospital also
cited a limited liability provision, which immunizes decisions of a review
organization if it acted “in the reasonable belief that the action or
recommendation is warranted by facts known to the person or the review
organization after reasonable efforts to ascertain the facts upon which the review
organization’s action or recommendation is made . . . .” MINN. STAT. § 145.63,
subdiv. 1 (2006). The hospital argued that this statute conflicts with the proposed
cause of action for negligent credentialing because it “creates a standard of care
different from the standard of care applicable to a simple negligence claim,
effectively elevating the burden of proof necessary to succeed in a claim against a
hospital for credentialing decisions.” Larson, 738 N.W.2d at 311.
121. Larson, 738 N.W.2d at 311.
122. Stringer v. Minn. Vikings Football Club, LLC, 705 N.W.2d 746, 763–68
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123

tort recovery from co-employees to gross negligence only.
The
majority further limited recovery by holding that tort victims must
also show that the co-employee was acting outside the course and
124
scope of employment.
Justice Hanson dissented, arguing that
because there are competing policy concerns relating to the scope
of co-employee liability, any narrowing of the common law should
125
come from the legislature, not the court.
Because he found no
express legislative intent to restrict co-employee liability in such a
way, he would have allowed the case to proceed to trial on the issue
126
of whether the co-employees were grossly negligent.
Justice Hanson also dissented in Urban v. American Legion
127
Department of Minnesota, where the court was asked to determine
whether the state and national chapters of the American Legion
could be held vicariously liable for the dram shop liability of a local
128
The Minnesota Civil Damages Act (CDA) created a new
post.
cause of action against liquor licensees that did not exist at
129
Under the common law, this direct statutory
common law.
liability would impose vicarious liability against the liable party’s
130
master.
But the majority focused on a different statute, section
340A.501, which makes the acts of an employee who sells alcohol
131
the same as the acts of the employer for purposes of the CDA.
The majority concluded that because section 340A.501 imposes
vicarious liability under certain circumstances, this indicates a
legislative intent to abolish vicarious liability under the CDA in all

(Minn. 2005) (Hanson, J., dissenting). Former Vikings player Korey Stringer died
from heat stroke in August of 2001 after two days of practice in high heat and
humidity. Id. at 748–50, 753. The issue on appeal involved the liability of the
Vikings’ medical services coordinator and an assistant trainer in providing care
and preventative treatment to Stringer. Id. at 753.
123. MINN. STAT. § 176.061, subdiv. 5(c) (2006).
124. Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 757–58. Justice Paul Anderson authored the four
justice majority opinion. Justice Page—a former Minnesota Vikings player—
recused himself. Justice Meyer joined in the dissent of Justice Hanson.
125. Id. at 763–64 (Hanson, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 764–65, 768.
127. 723 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2006).
128. Id. at 2.
129. MINN. STAT. § 340A.801, subdiv. 1 (2006). More specifically, the CDA
imposes dram shop liability for damages caused by an intoxicated person “against
a person who caused the intoxication of that person by illegally selling alcoholic
beverages.” Id.
130. Lange v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 297 Minn. 399, 403, 211 N.W.2d 783, 785
(1973).
131. MINN. STAT. § 340A.501 (2006).
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132

other circumstances, including dram shop liability.
Justice
Hanson disagreed, arguing that “the CDA does not abrogate, but
instead incorporates, common law principles of vicarious
133
liability.”
He explained that section 340A.501 does not create
vicarious liability; it “add[s] to a licensee’s common law vicarious
134
liability as an employer by creating a direct statutory liability.”
Because he believed this did not constitute clear legislative intent
to abolish the common law, Justice Hanson concluded that
vicarious liability should apply to the masters of licensees who are
135
directly liable under section 340A.801.
These decisions illustrate Justice Hanson’s concerns over
eroding the common law because of blind judicial deference to
legislative inaction or partial action.
His work reflects his
conviction toward preserving the function of the judiciary in
governing the common law. But also underlying these decisions is

132. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 4–7. It is difficult to reconcile this holding with Isles
Wellness, Inc. v. Progressive Northern Insurance Co., 703 N.W.2d 513, 515 (Minn.
2005). The Isles Wellness court ultimately held that the corporate practice of
chiropractic medicine was illegal because (1) Minnesota common law prohibits
the corporate practice of medicine, and (2) chiropractic constitutes the practice of
medicine. Id. at 521, 524. But the court had to explain why two statutes that
specifically prohibited the corporate practice of dentistry and veterinary medicine
did not indicate legislative intent to abrogate the common law prohibition of
corporations practicing all other types of medicine. The only explanation offered
was that the abrogation was not made “by express wording or necessary
implication.” Id. at 521. It is difficult to understand how section 340A.501
indicates an intent to abrogate the common law when the statutes prohibiting
dentistry and veterinary medicine do not. It should be noted that Justice Hanson
filed a dissenting opinion in Isles Wellness because he believed that the Minnesota
common law did not support a prohibition against the corporate practice of
medicine.
133. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 7 (Hanson, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 8 (emphasis added). Justice Hanson focused on the language in
section 340A.501 that makes the act of the employee the same as the act of the
employer for purposes of the CDA. Id. By way of contrast, vicarious liability
recognizes that the acts of the employee and the employer are distinct, but
imposes liability on the employer as a matter of “public policy to satisfy an
instinctive sense of justice.” Id. at 8 (quoting Lange, 297 Minn. at 403, 211 N.W.2d
at 785). Justice Hanson ultimately believed the majority erred by improperly
presuming that section 340A.501 abrogated the common law and relying on the
absence of legislative intent to the contrary, instead of presuming that the
legislature did not abrogate the common law absent clear intent to the contrary.
Id. at 8–9.
135. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 9. But Justice Hanson believed there were genuine
issues of material fact as to whether the state and national chapters of the
American Legion were in a principal-agent relationship such as to support a claim
for vicarious liability. Id. at 12–13.
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Justice Hanson’s desire to safeguard the rights of tort victims
seeking recovery for their injuries. Nowhere did he make this
desire more poignant than in his dissenting opinion from Schroeder
136
v. St. Louis County.
IV. THE SCHROEDER DISSENT
Under the government immunity doctrine, tort victims face
substantial barriers to recovery from governmental tortfeasors.
First, statutory immunity bars recovery for “[a]ny claim based upon
the performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty, whether or not the discretion is
137
abused.”
Next, official immunity shields “a public official
charged by law with duties which call for the exercise of his
138
judgment or discretion . . . .” Further, vicarious official immunity
shields a government agency when its employee’s conduct is
139
And an entirely
protected by the official immunity doctrine.
different immunity analysis applies to claims based on a violation of
140
the United States Constitution.
Several of these doctrines were invoked in the Schroeder
141
decision.
The plaintiff in Schroeder was killed when he collided
with a county-operated road grader operating on the wrong side of
142
The majority held that the county was entitled to
the road.
statutory immunity because operating the road grader against
136. 708 N.W.2d 497 (Minn. 2006).
137. MINN. STAT. § 466.03, subdiv. 6 (2006). Statutory immunity has generally
been interpreted to only apply to policy making-type activities. Nusbaum v.
County of Blue Earth, 422 N.W.2d 713, 718 (Minn. 1988). For purposes of this
determination, courts distinguish between planning functions, which involve the
consideration of social, political, or economic considerations and operational
functions, which involve the day-to-day operations of government, technical or
scientific skills, or the exercise of professional judgment. Holmquist v. State, 425
N.W.2d 230, 231–32 (Minn. 1988).
138. Anderson v. Anoka Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. 11, 678 N.W.2d 651, 655
(Minn. 2004) (quoting Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn.
1988)). Generally, the official immunity analysis inquires as to whether the
government official was exercising a ministerial function, which can give rise to
liability, or a discretionary function, which is protected. Id.
139. Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38, 42 (Minn. 1992).
140. See Mumm v. Mornson, 708 N.W.2d 475, 483 (Minn. 2006) (explaining
that “[q]ualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability ‘if their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.’”) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
141. 708 N.W.2d at 503.
142. Id. at 500–01.
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traffic was the result of an unwritten, policy-based decision that
143
In a dissent that is far longer than the
saved the county money.
majority opinion, Justice Hanson first noted the irony associated
with the court’s historically broad construction of statutory
immunity:
If the grader operator had been working for a private
party, he and his employer would surely be liable. In fact,
if the private employer had made a policy decision to
permit the creation of this dangerous condition, by
weighing the cost of remedying the danger against the
risk to human life, we would consider that policy
reprehensible—a callous disregard for the safety of others
that would warrant the imposition of punitive damages.
The question then is whether comparable conduct by the
government should escape liability, precisely because it
involved a policy made by weighing the cost of remedying
a dangerous condition against the risk to human life. I
would first conclude that, under an appropriately narrow
construction of our existing tort immunity law, the county
should not escape liability. But if our existing tort
immunity law does not yield this result, then I would
144
conclude that it is time to seriously reexamine that law.
145
Although the supreme court previously held to the contrary,
Justice Hanson explained that it is more logical and more
appropriate to not apply the statutory immunity exception to
situations where the government failed to warn of a dangerous
146
condition that it created. He concluded by suggesting that there
exists a substantial basis to overrule the court’s prior cases that held
147
to the contrary.
143. Id. at 505.
144. Id. at 509 (Hanson, J., concurring and dissenting).
145. See Holmquist v. State, 425 N.W.2d 230, 234–35 (Minn. 1988).
146. Schroeder, 708 N.W.2d at 513 (Hanson, J., concurring and dissenting)
(describing the term “statutory immunity” as “misnomer,” because it appears in a
statutory scheme with the “primary effect . . . of establish[ing] governmental
liability for the torts of its employees . . .”). The statutory immunity provision is
merely an exception that is extended to those acts. Id.
147. See id. at 513. However, because the Schroeders did not raise this issue,
Justice Hanson agreed with the majority that the court’s precedent should be
applied. Id. But he wrote separately to express his opinion that the court “should
be open to reexamine the question in a future case that presents it more fully and
squarely . . . .” Id. Justice Hanson went on to disagree with the majority’s
application of the statutory immunity exception. In his characteristic mastery of
the factual record, Justice Hanson cited affidavit testimony, deposition testimony,
and exhibits in reaching his conclusion that the county was not entitled to
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Noting that the doctrine is often applied but rarely
questioned, Justice Hanson then took the opportunity to critically
analyze the history and policy considerations underlying the official
immunity doctrine as well. He argued that the core justification for
official immunity—to avoid deterring independent action and
effective performance by government officials—has been “seriously
148
questioned” by reputed commentators, and has been all but
149
eliminated by the passage of the Municipal Tort Claims Act.
Justice Hanson concluded his dissent by characterizing official
immunity as a doctrine that is “not firmly grounded in reasoned
150
analysis.”
Although Justice Hanson made a compelling case for limiting
statutory immunity and abolishing official immunity, he ultimately
conceded that Schroeder was not the appropriate case to take such
151
drastic measures. But his exhaustive research, thorough analysis,
convincing logic, and candid acknowledgement of the court’s prior
oversights is certain to catch the attention of tort victims wading
152
their way through the government “immunity thicket” in the
immunity because the road grade operator failed to comply with the policy. Id. at
516.
148. Id. at 518 (quoting DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 273, at 733 (West
Group 2000)).
149. Id. Justice Hanson argued that:
the Municipal Tort Claims Act did adopt four provisions that
essentially eliminated the policy concerns that underlie official
immunity: (1) it established liability limits that also apply to direct
claims against public officers and employees (Minn. Stat. § 466.04,
subdiv. 1(a) (2004)); (2) it required that a notice of claim be given
within 180 days after loss or within 1 year for wrongful death (Minn.
Stat. § 466.05 (2004)); (3) it authorized the municipality to procure
insurance against liability, including that for liability of "its officers,
employees, and agents" (Minn. Stat. § 466.06 (2004)); and (4) it
required the municipality to defend and indemnify its "officers and
employees," subject to certain qualifications (Minn. Stat. § 466.07,
subdiv. 1 (2004)).
Id. at 517–18.
150. Schroeder, 708 N.W.2d at 520. Again, Justice Hanson declined to reverse
the court’s precedent in this case because the appellant failed to raise the issue.
Id. at 519. Thus Justice Hanson agreed with the majority that the driver of the
road grader was entitled to official immunity. Id. But he disagreed with the
majority’s conclusion that vicarious official immunity for the county necessarily
followed. Id. After an extensive analysis of the competing policy considerations,
Justice Hanson concluded that “[w]hen the interests of the county . . . are weighed
against the interests of an innocent victim to obtain compensation, I would
conclude that vicarious official immunity should not be available.” Id. at 521.
151. Id. at 513, 519.
152. Michael K. Jordan, Finding a Useful Path Through the Immunity Thicket, 61
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future. Perhaps that occasion will arise sooner than he expected.
When questioning the logic of immunizing policy decisions where
the government has no need to weigh the risk of liability for poor
choices, Justice Hanson posed a prophetic rhetorical question:
Could a county, for example, allow travelers to continue
to use an unsafe bridge, without warning, because it
weighed the safety of the travelers against budget
constraints that made it financially difficult to make the
bridge safe? One would hope not, but the extension of
the discretionary function exception to the deliberate
abdication of governmental responsibilities, purely for
cost-saving reasons, could produce precisely that extreme
153
result.
The collapse of the I-35 Bridge in downtown Minneapolis less
than two years later may well result in the litigation of this precise
issue. Accordingly, the Schroeder dissent may prove to be Justice
Hanson’s most significant work.
V. CONCLUSION
One need not have worked closely with Justice Hanson to
appreciate the many qualities that describe his judicial career:
impartiality, respect for the rule of law, scholarship, passion for his
work, and deference to the division of governmental powers are
among the many discussed in this article. Perhaps most revealing is
that these qualities are manifested in cases across such a broad
spectrum of factual circumstances and areas of law. Whether the
issue sounded in tort, contract, statute, the common law, court
rules, or constitutional interpretation, litigants could be assured
that every argument would be closely scrutinized, every brief
thoroughly reviewed, every issue independently researched, and
every opinion carefully drafted.
Those who have had the honor of working directly with Justice
Hanson witnessed the foundations of these qualities. His desk was
routinely covered with open volumes of the Northwest Reporter.
And it was not uncommon to find him reading reporters from
other jurisdictions. Nor was it unusual to pass him in the treatise
aisle of the supreme court library, or to find him in his law clerk’s
office pouring over deposition and trial transcripts. On the bench,
BENCH & BAR OF MINN., 24, 28–29 (Oct. 2004).
153. Schroeder, 708 N.W.2d at 512 (Hanson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
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his reverent demeanor put practitioners at ease; but his incisive
questions struck at the heart of the controversy, exposing
weaknesses in arguments and enriching debate. The product of
Justice Hanson’s work is a legacy of scholarship that will extend far
beyond the relatively short duration of his time on the bench.
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